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Abstract
This paper examines the role of dual sourcing (e.g., outside options) in vertical and
horizontal relations. In a bilateral monopoly market, if either the upstream or downstream
rm has outside options, the other rm could lose from seemingly positive shocks, e.g., mar-
ket expansion or technology improvements. We extend this setting to a bilateral duopoly
market in which each downstream rm has outside options and upstream rms can engage
in cost reducing investments and generate technological spillovers. We nd that each up-
stream rm has an incentive to voluntarily generate technological spillovers to its upstream
rival if the downstream rms have better outside options.
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1 Introduction
The management literature documents a long list of \dual sourcing." Asanuma (1985) shows
that Japanese rms bring rival parts suppliers to work together in some situations, while in
other situations they keep the suppliers away from each other to create competition.1 Ka-
math and Liker (1994) describe how Japanese automakers would invite guest engineers from
rival suppliers to compete side-by-side, to see who could come up with a better design. Dyer
and Nobeoka (2000) document the practices in Toyota, which constitute of dierent layers
within the supplier network, ranging from bilateral relations (i.e., sending Toyota's internal
lean-production experts to advise suppliers), to sub-networks (i.e., establishing supplier learn-
ing groups where rival suppliers help each other study and implement the Toyota Production
System), to more encompassing network structures (i.e., regular meetings within Toyota's sup-
plier association). Subsequently, Wilhelm (2012) nds that such practices still exist today in
Japanese rms and they create not only cooperation but also competition between suppliers
within the network. Wu and Choi (2005) investigate the cases of eight buyers, and nd that
even a long-term buyer-supplier relationship does not prevent the buyer from nding alter-
native suppliers to create competition.2 In another study, Wu et al. (2010) simulate such
\co-opetition," where competing suppliers work together to meet the needs of the buyer.
The present paper examines the aforementioned phenomenon of dual-sourcing, in an ex-
tended setup of both vertical and horizontal competition. We start by considering a simple
bilateral monopoly where a supplier sells its input to a buyer. The payment to the supplier
is negotiated between the two parties,3 but aected by the buyer's eorts to search for fringe
1 Soucing strategies have been discussed by management researchers since Porter (1980), which views multiple
sourcing as a mechanism for a rm to aect its bargaining power relative to both inside and outside suppliers,
which is exactly what we rigorously model here.
2 In the context of international trade, recently several researchers investigate the eects of bi-sourcing
(make-and-buy) from home and foreign markets (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Rob and Vettas, 2003; Choi and
Davidson, 2004; Mukherjee, 2008).
3 Such negotiations are common in the literature (see Davidson, 1988; Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; Dobson
and Waterson, 1997; O'Brien and Shaer, 2005; Bjornerstedt and Stennek, 2007; Inderst, 2007; Milliou and
Petrakis, 2007). Recently, Iozzi and Valletti (2014) comprehensively discuss vertical relations with bilateral
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suppliers. In other words, the buyer has an outside option to procure its input with, i.e., \dual
sourcing."
With this simple setup, we rst show that dual sourcing can aect protability in uncon-
ventional ways. For instance, the usual sources for potential gains such as a market expansion
may not benet the supplier, opposite to what one might expect. Intuitively, as the market
size rises, the buyer raises its search eort for alternative sourcing, weakening the bargaining
position of the supplier. As a result, a market expansion while beneting the downstream
rm, can hurt the upstream rm. Furthermore, in the Appendix, we reverse the roles of the
upstream and downstream rms, and nd our basic mechanism remains robust.
We then generalize the above setup to the case of a bilateral duopoly, again with dual
sourcing by buyers, and incorporating cost-reducing investments (e.g., R&D) by the suppliers.
We nd surprisingly that each supplier has an incentive to unilaterally generate technology
spillovers to its rival for free, if its own downstream buyer can nd cheap alternative sourcing.
Such spillovers generate a market-size shrink, which can hurt the downstream buyer but ben-
et the supplier, via the bargaining mechanism described above. We show that the unilateral
spillovers are strategic complements in the sense that it can induce the rival to also gener-
ate technology spillovers, and such technology spillovers can benet both the buyers and the
suppliers.
Our results provide rationale for why the Japanese \suppliers' associations" still have strong
support (see Sako, 1996) from both suppliers and auto makers, even though these associations
may at times generate outward spillovers to rivals. Sako nds that a supplier would typically
join in several suppliers' associations and hold multiple memberships, aiming at obtaining in-
formation on production plans and solicitating suggestion for common problems such as stan-
dardization and pollution control, etc.4 As such, the suppliers' association has been eective
Nash bargaining.
4 In 1990s, almost all major Japanese auto manufacturers (except Honda) have suppliers' associations, and
many suppliers join multiple associations (Sako, 1996, p.651). Part suppliers that join in multiple suppliers'
associations tend to be large in size and play a leading role in association activities (Sako, 1996, p. 656).
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in diusing innovative practices in the automobile industry. Our model supports her ndings
with a rigorous theory: dual sourcing by automakers can stabilize the suppliers' associations
for strategic reasons.
The present paper while simple, generates novel results that match the real practices of
many rms on vertically and horizontally related production networks, such as the automobile
makers and parts suppliers documented in the literature. We explicitly show conventionally
counterintuitive situations when the supplier may lose from a market expansion and when it
may choose to give out its own technology to rivals. Our mechanism has wide applications
under dierent circumstances, for instance, suppliers' incentives in cost reduction, quality im-
provement, upstream collaboration and technology spillovers, and even worker training in the
labor market.
Feng and Lu (2012) also use a similar market structure as ours to examine bilateral duopoly,
and show that a simultaneous eciency improvement of both suppliers can harm the down-
stream rm although the total industry prots rise. Their results are obtained based on down-
stream competition and asymmetric bargaining power in each vertical chain, which are not
required in our model.
Several other papers investigate cases in which downstream rms engage in R&D and
endogenously determine the degree of R&D spillover.5 Kultti and Takalo (1998) and Poyago-
Theotoky (1999) discuss whether downstream duopolists generate R&D spillover after deter-
mining their investment levels. Kamien and Zhang (2000), Gil-Molto et al. (2005), Piga and
Poyago-Theotoky (2005) and Milliou (2009) discuss cases in which downstream rms nonco-
operatively set the degree of R&D spillover before setting investment levels.6 Milliou (2009)
shows that oligopolists prefer generating outward R&D spillover if the degree of product dif-
ferentiation is high enough, a result that does not hold if the products are homogenous as in
5 De Bondt (1997) and Rockett (2012) nicely survey the literature of R&D competition.
6 In Kamien and Zhang (2000), no rm has an incentive to generate spillover. In Gil-Molto et al. (2005) and
Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005), because spillover is reciprocal, rms have incentives to generate a positive
degree of spillover.
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our paper. Subsequently, Milliou and Petrakis (2012) show that a vertically integrated rm
chooses to fully disclose its production knowledge to the downstream rival to expand down-
stream production, which eventually benets the integrated upstream sector. Their result is
less likely to hold if the degree of product dierentiation is low. Yoshida (2015) also shows
a possibility that a downstream rm has an incentive to give its superior technology to its
rival in a downstream multi-product duopoly with vertical relations. Product multiplicity is
the key factor to derive his main result. And nally, De Fraja (1993), Katsoulacos and Ulph
(1998), and Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2012) investigate market environments where
free revealing of technological knowledge can appear, in the context of continuous-time R&D
competition.7 In contrast, our paper provides another rationale behind such behavior, based
on bargaining and outside options.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 investigates a bilateral monopoly and establishes
a benchmark result. Section 3 extends the benchmark model to the case of bilateral duopoly
with cost-reducing activities by upstream suppliers, and examines both one-sided and cross
spillovers in technology. Section 4 briey discusses the relation between the main results and
the real-world phenomena. Section 5 concludes the paper. In the Appendix, we demonstrate
the robustness of our results by reversing the roles played by the downstream and upstream
rms in the benchmark model.
2 Bilateral Monopoly
We start with a benchmark bilateral monopoly model and demonstrate a basic result in the
simplest way|a general positive shock such as a market expansion can hurt the rm with
worse or even xed outside option in negotiations, even though the shock increases the size of
the total pie (rents). But, it benets the rm that can improve its outside option.
7 Harho et al. (2003) is a seminal work of voluntary information spillovers in the context of management.
See also Penin (2007) for a recent survey on open knowledge transfer.
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2.1 The basic setting
Consider a downstream rm and an upstream rm without any production cost for simplicity,
whose outputs are related in a one-to-one ratio. However, the downstream rm has an outside
option: by incurring a xed cost F , it can procure the input from a dierent source at price
w(e) if negotiation with the upstream rm breaks down, where e is the search eort of the
downstream rm to improve the value of its outside option, at a cost of S(e).8 We assume
w0(e) < 0, w00(e) > 0; and S0(e)  0, S00(e) > 0.
Let us rst investigate the simplest game structure: in the rst stage, the downstream rm
makes a search eort e to improve its outside option; in the second stage, both rms bargain
over the trading terms (a two-part tari, mq + T , where m is the wholesale price and T is the
xed payment). If bargaining breaks down, the downstream rm executes its outside option
at the xed cost F , with a marginal cost of w(e) (similar to Inderst and Valletti, 2009); nally,
in the third stage, the downstream rm sets the quantity of nal output. The game is solved
by backward induction.
To keep the model simple and clean, we assume the search cost to be sunk, in a way similar
to R&D investments in innovation models, where actual production and any price or prot
negotiation occurs afterwards.9 Let the inverse demand function in the downstream market be
p(q; a), where q is the quantity and a is a positive parameter that can shift up the demand,
such as market size, income, etc.
In the last stage, the downstream rm chooses the nal quantity q to maximize its prots
8 The assumption concerning outside options follows that in Inderst and Valletti (2009). However, here we
endogenize the price.
9 An alternative is to let the two parties bargain rst and then the downstream rm search if bargaining
breaks down. In that case, however, since search begins after bargaining breaks down, delay of production
occurs, which is costly to the downstream rm. In order to avoid such delay cost, the downstream rm thus
chooses to search before bargaining occurs. Also, Feng and Lu (2012) assume simultaneous bargaining over
output and transfer payment. In contrast, the sequential timing structure in our model claries what happens
in each stage. Furthermore, our model formulation endogenizes the outside opportunity of the downstream rm
along the lines of Inderst and Valletti (2009).
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(p(q; a) m)q   T , resulting in the following rst-order and second-order conditions:
F.O.C. p(q; a) m+ pq(q; a)q = 0;
S.O.C. 2pq(q; a) + pqq(q; a)q < 0;
where pq(q; a) = @p(q; a)=@q and pqq(q; a) = @
2p(q; a)=@q2.
Let q(m; a) denote the equilibrium quantity in which the wholesale price is m. Then the
gross prots of the downstream and the upstream rms (excluding the search costs of the
downstream rm) in the second stage are given as respectively,
D = [p(q(m; a); a) m]q(m; a)  T ; U = mq(m; a) + T;
The rms' outside options are respectively,
OD = [p(q(w(e); a); a)  w(e)]q(w(e); a)  F ; OU = 0:
During bargaining, they jointly maximize10
G = fD   ODgfU   0g:
The rst-order conditions @G=@T = 0 and @G=@m = 0 can be reexpressed as:
D   OD   U = 0;
(D   OD)[q(m; a) +mqm(m; a)]  Uq(m; a)
= (D   OD   U )q(m; a) + (D   OD)mqm(m; a) = (D   OD)mqm(m; a) = 0:
From the above, we obtain
m = 0; T =
p(q(0; a); a)q(0; a)  [p(q(w(e); a); a)  w(e)]q(w(e); a) + F
2
:
Since bargaining is ecient, the two rms set the wholesale price equal to the marginal cost
of the upstream rm, i.e., m = 0, to maximize their joint prots rst, and then, they split the
10 Matsushima and Shinohara (2014, pp. 430{1) explain a plausibility of using Nash bargaining to capture
the negotiations between buyers and suppliers in the Japanese automobile industry.
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overall prots through the lump-sum payment, T . As such, the \double marginalization" prob-
lem in a standard bilateral-monopoly situation is avoided. Expecting the bargained outcome,
the prots of the two rms respectively become
D(e) = [p(q(m); a) m]q(m; a)  T   S(e)
=
[p(q(0; a); a)]q(0; a) + [p(q(w(e); a); a)  w(e)]q(w(e); a)  F   2S(e)
2
;
U (e) =
[p(q(0; a); a)]q(0; a)  [p(q(w(e); a); a)  w(e)]q(w(e); a) + F
2
:
Then in the rst stage, the downstream rm chooses search eort, satisfying the following
rst-order condition,
@D(e)
@e
= 0,  w
0(e)q(w(e); a) + 2S0(e)
2
= 0: (1)
2.2 Market size
As promised, we now investigate how a marginal increase in parameter a (e.g., market size or
income) aects the equilibrium outcome. Applying the envelop theorem yields
2@U (e
)
@a
= pa(q(0; a); a)q(0; a)  pa(q(w(e); a); a)q(w(e); a) + w0(e)q(w(e); a)de

da
: (2)
where pa  @p(q; a)=@a and e is the equilibrium level of search eort. Total dierentiation of
(1) gives
de
da
=
w0(e)qa(w(e); a)
 fw00(e)q(w(e); a) + [w0(e)]2qm(w(e); a) + 2S00(e)g ;
where qm  @q(m; a)=@m. It is easy to show de=da > 0, because the denominator is derived
from the second-order condition of (1).
Let us examine (2) in detail. If w(e) is suciently small (e.g., approaching zero), the rst
and second terms on the RHS cancel out, leaving only the third term and hence @U (e
)=@a <
0. Thus,
Proposition 1 An increase in the parameter a decreases U (e
) if w(e) is suciently small.
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This Proposition implies that a market expansion actually harms the upstream rm, op-
posite to what one might conventionally think. Intuitively, as the market size rises, the down-
stream rm raises its search eort, which then weakens the bargaining position of the upstream
rm, leading to our result.
To summarize, positive shocks such as market size increases enlarge the pie and could bring
potential gains for all players. However, if some players can raise their outside options, they
can take away more than the increase of the pie, leaving others worse o. Also note that the
same logic applies to a setting with n outside options, where the rm would use the best one
of them and the rest of the options (n  1) becomes irrelevant.
Example Assume that p = a   q, w(e) = w   e, and S(e) = e2=2, with a and  being
positive constants.11 The second stage net prots of the two rms are then given as
D(e) =
1
8
 
a2 + [a  w(e)]2   4F   S(e); and U (e) = 1
8
 
a2 + [a  w(e)]2 + 4F 
In the rst stage, the rst-order condition of the downstream rm is
@D(e)
@e
=
a  w   (4   1)e
4
= 0 ! e = a  w
4   1 :
Since the quantity under which bargaining breaks down, (a   w(e))=2, is smaller than when
agreement is reached, we require a < 4w: Substituting e into U (e) gives
U (e
) =
[(8   1)a  4w](4w   a)
8(4   1)2 +
F
2
:
The rst term is positive if
4w
8   1 < a < 4w:
Dierentiating U (e
) with respect to a yields
@U (e
)
@a
=
162w   (8   1)a
4(4   1)2 ;
that is negative if and only if
162w
8   1 < a < 4w;
under which a rise in market size a decreases the prot of the upstream rm.
11We assume w(e) = w   e for mathematical simplicity, although w00(e) = 0 here.
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3 Bilateral Duopoly
In this section we extend the above benchmark model to a case of two pairs of downstream
and upstream rms, denoted by Di and Ui respectively (i = 1; 2). By doing so, we add
competition to the upstream and downstream rms, forming a setup of both vertical and
horizontal competition. We further show that improving one's outside option has strategic
eects, which surprisingly can hurt oneself under certain conditions. And upstream rms,
being aware of this mechanism, may give away their own technology to rivals, for free in an
extreme.
3.1 The basic setting of duopoly
Just as in the benchmark, to produce a unit of the nal product, rm Di needs one unit of
the input produced by rm Ui but not Uj . However, Di has outside options: it can procure
the input from a dierent source at the price ~wi(ei) = w  ei if the negotiation with Ui breaks
down, where ei is the search eort of Di, with a cost of S(ei). Simultaneously, Ui engages
in cost-reducing activities such as process R&D (which was absent in the benchmark case),
through which it can reduce its marginal cost to ci(Ii) = c   Ii, where Ii is the investment of
Ui at a cost of f(Ii). We assume c(< w) to be constant to ensure an interior solution.
We then take into account technological spillovers between upstream rms, i.e., the cost-
reducing eort by Uj spills over to Ui. To obtain clear-cut results, following Milliou (2009),
here we explicitly solve the game with linear demand and specic investment functions; p =
a  q1   q2, S(ei) = e2i , and f(Ii) = I2i , where qi is the quantity supplied by Di. We assume
that the marginal cost of Ui is ci(Ii; Ij) = c  Ii   rIj if Uj chooses to give its reduced cost to
Ui, where r 2 [0; 1] is the degree of knowledge spillover.12
Consider the following game structure. In the rst stage, each upstream rm simultaneously
determines whether to unilaterally generate spillover to its upstream rival. In the second stage,
12 This setup of spillovers is quite dierent from the related literature on research joint ventures (see for
instance, Amir et al., 2003; d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; and Suzumura, 1992), where rms conduct joint
R&D in the rst stage and then compete in the product market in the second stage.
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each of the four rms simultaneously sinks an investment cost that determines the eort level
to improve its outside option (downstream rms) or to reduce its marginal cost (upstream
rms). In the third stage, observing the eort levels in the second stage, the upstream and
the downstream rms on the same vertical chain negotiate over a transfer payment (a two-part
tari). The determined transfer payment is privately known in the vertical chain, but unknown
to outsiders. This assumption simplies the analysis since the Nash equilibrium wholesale price
is set at the marginal cost of the upstream rm on each vertical chain.13 If an agreement
is reached, the downstream rm procures its input from the upstream rm; otherwise, the
downstream rm exercises its outside option. For expositional simplicity, we omit the xed
cost. Finally, in the forth stage, all downstream rms simultaneously set quantities to maximize
their own prots. The game is again solved by backward induction.
We denote the gross nal stage prot (excluding investments costs sunk in the second stage)
on the vertical chain i as i(ci; cj), where ci and cj are respectively the marginal costs on the
vertical chains i and j, and Ti as the payment from the downstream to the upstream rm
when bargaining reaches an agreement. Then i(ci; cj)  Ti is the gross prot of Di, excluding
investment costs already sunk in the second stage, and Ti becomes the gross prot of Ui. Note
that to obtain the net prot of each rm, the sunk cost of investment in the second stage must
be subtracted from the above.
From the forth-stage game, given that the marginal cost of Di is di, as in the standard
Cournot duopoly outcome, the quantity supplied by Di and the nal-stage gross prot on the
vertical chain i are given as respectively
qi(di; dj) =
a+ dj   2di
3
; and i(di; dj) = (qi(di; dj))
2; i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i: (3)
If Di and Ui reach an agreement, di is ci(Ii); otherwise, it is ~wi(ei). Note that the functional
form of ci(Ii) is replaced by ci(Ii; Ij) if Uj chooses to give its reduced cost technology to Ui.
13 Notice the dierence from a case where contract terms are used as a commitment device to foster aggressive
behavior at the downstream level (e.g., Fershtman and Judd, 1987). The qualitative nature of our results would
not change if contracts are observable.
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In the third stage, the pair Di and Ui on the same vertical chain i maximize the following
Nash product with respect to T :
Gi = [i(ci; cj)  Ti   i( ~wi; cj)]Ti;
where i( ~wi; cj) and 0 are respectively their gross prots if bargaining breaks down. Optimiza-
tion gives
T i =
i(ci; cj)  i( ~wi; cj)
2
:
Then substitution yields the net prots as respectively
Ui = T

i   f(Ii) =
i(ci; cj)  i( ~wi; cj)
2
  f(Ii); (4)
Di = i(ci; cj)  T i   S(e) =
i(ci; cj) + i( ~wi; cj)
2
  S(e): (5)
Similar to the discussion in the previous section, a decrease in cj reduces qi, inducing Di to
lower ei, which decreases i( ~wi; cj) through an increase in ~wi indirectly. Simultaneously, the
decrease in cj also directly lowers both i(ci; cj) and i( ~wi; cj).
3.2 Spillover eects
In the second stage, we consider three scenarios: no upstream rm generates spillover; only
one upstream rm generates spillover; both upstream rms generate spillovers.
3.2.1 No spillover
First, we look into the case when no upstream rm generates spillover to its rival. In the
investment stage, from (5) and (4), the objective functions are given as
Ui =
i(ci(Ii); cj(Ij))  i( ~wi(ei); cj(Ij))
2
  f(Ii); (6)
Di =
i(ci(Ii); cj(Ij)) + i( ~wi(ei); cj(Ij))
2
  S(ei): (7)
The rst-order conditions lead to the reaction functions:
Ii(Ij) =
  Ij
9   2 ; ei(Ij) =
  2   Ij
9   2 ; (8)
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where   a c and   w c. Note that ei(Ij) in (8) includes only the investment level of the
rival's upstream rm Uj because Di's eort is related to its outside option, i( ~wi(ei); cj(Ij)).
Solving the simultaneous equations, we have the investment levels:
Ii =

9   1 ; e

i =
(9   2)  2(9   1)
(9   2)(9   1) :
The net prot of each rm then becomes
Ui (N;N) =
(9   2)2
2(9   1)2  
92((9   2)  2(9   1))2
2(9   1)2(9   2)2 ;
Di (N;N) =
922
2(9   1)2 +
((9   2)  2(9   1))2
2(9   1)2(9   2) ;
where k and l in Di (k; l) and 
U
i (k; l) respectively represent the decisions of upstream rms
1 and 2 for generating spillover (k; l = Y;N), with Y and N indicating yes and no.
3.2.2 One-sided spillover
Next, consider the case in which only the reduced cost of U1 is spilled over to U2 but not the
other way around. The cost function of U2 can be rewritten as c2(I2; I1) = c  I2   rI1. From
(5) and (4), the objective functions of the rms are respectively
U1 =
1(c1(I1); c2(I2; I1))  1( ~w1(e1); c2(I2; I1))
2
  f(I1); (9)
D1 =
1(c1(I1); c2(I2; I1)) + 1( ~w1(e1); c2(I2; I1))
2
  S(e1); (10)
U2 =
2(c2(I2; I1); c1(I1))  2( ~w2(e2); c1(I1))
2
  f(I2); (11)
D2 =
2(c2(I2; I1); c1(I1)) + 2( ~w2(e2); c1(I1))
2
  S(e2): (12)
Then, the eort level of U1, I1, inuences the outside value of D1, 1( ~w1(e1); c2(I2; I1)), as well
as the downstream prot, 1(c1(I1); c2(I2; I1)). The voluntary spillover generates a strategic
interaction between the endogenous eort levels of U1 and D1, through 1( ~w1(e1); c2(I2; I1)).
Specically, an increase in I1 decreases c2, inducing D1 to lower e1. This eect can benet U1
especially when ~w1(e1) is small, since the marginal eect of lowering e1 on the outside prot
of D1 increases as its \eciency," ~w1(e1), improves.
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In the investment stage, each rm's reaction function is obtained as respectively
I1(I2; e1) =
  r   I2 + re1
9   2(1  r) ; (13)
I2(I1) =
  (1  2r)I1
9   2 ; (14)
e1(I2; I1) =
  2   I2   rI1
9   2 ; (15)
e2(I1) =
  2   I1
9   2 : (16)
e2(I1) is the same in both (16) and (8). Note that the technology spillover generates three
additional eects on these reaction functions. First, the eort by D1 enhances the incentive of
U1 to engage in cost reduction (see (13)), because the spillover allows U1 to directly decrease
the outside prot of D1 through its own investment. Second, the eort by U1 can increase
the incentive of U2 if the degree of spillover is large (see (14)), which is similar to that in the
context of research joint ventures (e.g., d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). Finally, the eort
by U1 lowers the incentive of D1 to increase its outside value (see (15)), similar to the reason
in the rst eect. Putting these all together, the spillover generates a positive impact on the
eciency of the rival upstream rm but a negative one on the downstream partner's eort to
improve its outside option. The former impact hurts the technology giver while the latter one
benets it, and which eect is bigger can be explained as follows.
Solving the simultaneous equations gives:
I1 =
(3   1)(9   2 + r)  3(9   2)r
(9   2 + r)((9   1)(3   1) + 3r) ;
I2 =
(3   1 + r)(9   2 + r)+ 3(1  2r)r
(9   2 + r)((9   1)(3   1) + 3r) ;
e1 =
(3   1)(9   2 + r)  (2(3   1)(9   1) + (12   1)r   3r2)
(9   2 + r)((9   1)(3   1) + 3r) ;
e2 =
((3   1)(9   2) + 3r)(9   2 + r)
(9   2)(9   2 + r)((9   1)(3   1) + 3r)
 (2(3   1)(9   2)(9   1) + (2  30 + 81
2)r + 6r2)
(9   2)(9   2 + r)((9   1)(3   1) + 3r) :
Further substitution yields the rms' equilibrium prots, which are messy algebraically (see
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Figure 1: Condition for voluntary spillover to benet U1
Appendix 2):
U1 (Y;N); 
D
1 (Y;N); 
U
2 (Y;N); 
D
2 (Y;N);
given that the cost reduction of U1 is spilled over to U2.
Using the above, we can examine whether the voluntary spillover increases the prot of U1.
A simple comparison leads to:14
Proposition 2 U1

(Y;N) > U1

(N;N) if and only if  < (Y N), where (Y N) is  such
that U1

(Y;N) = U1

(N;N). Similarly, U2

(N;Y ) > U2

(N;N) if and only if  < (Y N).
The threshold value of , (Y N), is depicted in Figure 1. U1 benets by giving its technol-
ogy to the rival for free, if the above condition is satised. Similarly, we can numerically show
that giving U1's technology to U2 harms D1.
15
14 In Section 3, we explicitly derive the threshold values in the propositions. The le is available upon request.
15 The ex ante commitment to generating technological spillovers is crucial in deriving the above results. Given
that the eort levels have already been determined, normally each upstream rm does not have an incentive to
give its technology to its rival upstream. For our results to hold, each upstream rm must commit to giving out
its technology before choosing eort levels, while the size of spillovers is not so essential.
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3.2.3 Two-sided spillovers
Finally, we examine the case when both U1 and U2 cross spillover, specically, the cost function
of Ui is given by ci(Ii; Ij) = c   Ii   rIj (i; j = 1; 2, j 6= i). Except this ex-post cost of the
upstream rms, the timing structure of the game is similar to the case under one-sided spillover
just examined. From (5) and (4), the objective functions of Ui and Di are given as respectively
(i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i)
Ui =
1
2
(i(ci(Ii; Ij); cj(Ij ; Ii))  i( ~wi(ei); cj(Ij ; Ii)))  f(Ii); (17)
Di =
1
2
(i(ci(Ii; Ij); cj(Ij ; Ii)) + i( ~wi(ei); cj(Ij ; Ii)))  S(ei): (18)
Rearranging the rst-order conditions, @Ui =@Ii = 0 and @
D
i =@ei = 0, gives the following
reaction functions
Ii(Ij ; ei) =
  r   (1  r)2Ij + rei
9   2(1  r) ; (19)
ei(Ii; Ij) =
  2   rIi   Ij
9   2 : (20)
Under reciprocal spillovers, the reaction function of Ui in (19) diers from that in (13). However,
the reaction function of Di in (20) is the same with that in (15), because the outside prot
does not depend on the inside transfer price, ci(Ii; Ij).
Solving the simultaneous equations leads to
Ii =
(9   (2  r))  9r
(9   2)(9   1) + r + (9   1)r2 ;
ei =
(9   (2  r)(1 + r))  (18   (2  r)(1 + r))
(9   2)(9   1) + r + (9   1)r2 :
We can explicitly solve the game and derive the equilibrium prots, which are again messy
(see Appendix 2):
Ui (Y; Y ); 
D
i (Y; Y ):
Here we only show how the exogenous variables ( and r) aect the equilibrium prots.
In Figure 2, the vertical axis indicates the prot level, ji (j = U;D); and the horizontal axis
indicates the value of r. The gures show that the degree of spillovers raises rm protability.
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Note: We set  = 3,  = 2, and  = 1=20.
Figure 2: The prots of the upstream and downstream rms.
Upstream rm Downstream rm
Note: We set  = 3 and  = 1=20 to draw the gures.
Figure 3: The prots of the upstream and downstream rms.
Since  = a   c and  = w   c, an increase in  reects an increase in a, expanding the
market size. As previously shown, an increase in  does not always improve the protability
of each upstream rm in the absence of spillovers (Figure 3).
Note that the left-hand side of Figure 3 also shows several properties: i). An increase in
the market size monotonically and signicantly raises the prot of each upstream rm when
the degree of spillovers is large enough, because the outside option of Di decreases with the
degree of spillovers. ii). The spillover eect is more signicant on the upstream rms than the
downstream rms, caused by the former rms' investment to lower the outside option of the
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latter rms. iii). The spillover eect on the rival's eciency is magnied, when the downstream
rm also has a stronger incentive to raise its own option value. In turn, an increase in r enhances
the incentive of each upstream rm to engage in cost-reducing activity, raising their prots.
We can explicitly derive the threshold value of  (denoted as (Y Y )) at which Ui's prot
when both upstream rms generate spillovers equals that when only Uj generates spillover. A
simple comparison gives:
Proposition 3 U1 (Y; Y ) > U1 (N;Y ) if and only if  < (Y Y ), where (Y Y ) is  such
that U1 (Y; Y ) = U1 (N;Y ). Similarly, U2 (Y; Y ) > U2 (Y;N) if and only if  < (Y Y ).
The threshold value (Y Y ), and the dierence between (Y Y ) and (Y N) are summarized
in Figure 4. From these threshold values, the decisions of the upstream rms depend on the
exogenous values = and r. As = rises, the incentive of each downstream rm to increase
its search eort becomes weaker, which in turn lowers the incentive of each upstream rm for
technology spillovers.
(Y Y ) (Y Y )  (Y N)
Figure 4: The conditions that upstream rms generate spillovers.
3.3 Endogenous spillover eects
So far we have examined either one-way or two-way but exogenous giveaway of upstream
technology.
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In the rst stage, each upstream rm Ui unilaterally determines whether to generate tech-
nological spillover to its rival upstream rm Uj .
16 Depending on the threshold values of , we
nd:
Proposition 4 (i). If  < (Y Y ), both U1 and U2 voluntarily generate spillovers; (ii). If  >
(Y N), no upstream rm voluntarily generates spillover; and (iii). If (Y N) <  < (Y Y ),
multiple equilibria exist.
Figure 5 shows, under high parameter values of =, neither upstream rm is willing to
give its technology out; Under intermediate values, both rms can either generate technology
spillovers to the rival or not at all, i.e., multiple equilibria exist; Under low values of the same
parameter ratio, each upstream rm has incentives to generate spillover in equilibrium.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
r
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
0.050
ΒΑ
No firm
No firm, Two firms
Two firms
ΒHYYL
ΒHYNL
Figure 5: Endogenous determination of spillover eects ( = 3)
The logic can be understood as follows. As in the monopoly case, a lower = enhances the
incentives of the downstream rms to increase their search eorts, which induces each upstream
rm to generate spillovers to mitigate its downstream partner's incentive to search. Figure 6
shows that the investment of a spillover-generating upstream rm and that of a downstream
rm are negatively correlated with =.
16 It can be straightforwardly shown that Uj does not have an incentive to refuse the unilateral spillover.
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(Investment levels: upstream) (Investment levels: downstream)
Figure 6: The equilibrium investment levels ( = 3, r = 1=2)
(Y; Y ): Both upstream rms generate spillovers.
(Y;N): Only U1 generates spillover.
(N;N): No upstream rm generates spillover.
Note: e2(Y;N) > ei(N;N) > ei(Y; Y ) > e1(Y;N)
Note that investment spillover is a key reason for multiple equilibria under intermediate
values of =. In Figure 5, the lower line indicates the threshold value of = for which Ui has
incentives to generate spillover given that U i does not generate spillover. As in (14), generating
unilateral spillovers increases the rival upstream's investment since it raises the rival's quantity
(see also the dierence between I1(Y;N) and I2(Y;N) in Figure 7), diminishing the incentive
for unilateral spillover. The negative eect is stronger as the degree of spillover increases.
However, the negative eect is almost canceled out by the decrease in the downstream partner's
investment (see e1(Y;N) in Figure 7), which is shown by the gentle slope of the lower line in
Figure 5.
Next, the threshold value of = for which Ui has an incentive to generate spillover given
that U i generates spillover too, can be reected by the upper curve in Figure 5, which is
concave and shows the changes in the reactions of the upstream rms through spillovers. Given
that its rival generates spillovers, a rm's own spillover causes two eects: (i) the rival's free
riding on the investment and (ii) the loss of its aggressive investment through unilaterally
receiving spillovers. The free-riding eect is weaker than when only one upstream rm generates
spillover (compare (19) with (14)), which increases its incentive for generating spillover. As a
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Figure 7: The equilibrium investment levels ( = 3, = = 1=25)
(Y; Y ): Both upstream rms generate spillovers.
(Y;N): Only U1 generates spillover.
(N;N): No upstream rm generates spillover.
result, the threshold value of = rises above than when no upstream rm generates spillover,
leading to multiple equilibria. This eect, while positive, is however partially canceled out by
the latter loss which increases with the degree of spillovers (see (14)), shifting down the upper
curve of = for a higher r in Figure 5.
Further, the above results are obtained based on the assumption that the downstream
rms' eorts are independent from each other (i.e., ei does not inuence the outside option of
Dj (i; j = 1; 2, j 6= i)). If on the contrary, ei also improves the outside option of Dj , then
each upstream rm has a stronger incentive to generate positive spillovers, just to mitigate the
eorts of the downstream rms.
Finally, we check whether the voluntary spillover benets the downstream rms. Simple
calculations lead to:
Proposition 5 Di (Y; Y ) > 
D
i (N;N) if and only if  < (9   2)=((1 + r)(9   1)):
Note here the upper bound of  is higher than (Y Y ), which implies the downstream rms
benet from such voluntary spillovers from the upstream rms.
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4 Discussion
The above results may explain the following stylized facts. \Mr. Toyoda was instrumental
in forging a technology tie-up agreement between Denso and Bosch" (Anderson, 2010, p.94).
The relationships among autoparts suppliers Denso and Bosch, and major automakers Ford,
Mitsubishi and Toyota are perhaps good examples. Denso originated as a parts division of
Toyota, spun o from Toyota in 1949 and initially supplied parts only to Toyota, gradually
developed other sales channels and now provides parts to all major automakers in the world
(e.g., Ford, General Motors, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, except Nissan). Interestingly, Denso
also has licensing and joint venture relationships with its direct rival, Bosch, in Europe and
the U.S., the aim of which was to share technology and gain economies of scale and scope.
Similarly, Suzuki (1993) nds that there are two types of R&D spillovers in the Japanese
electrical machinery industry, one among members within a keiretsu group such as NEC and
the other between members of dierent keiretsu groups (e.g., between members of NEC and
Fujitsu), although the former is more signicant than the latter. These horizontal and vertical
relationships match very well the settings we have examined above.
Furthermore, our results suggest that giving up patents can spur innovation and increase
prots in the industry, which might explain the recent surprise moves by Tesla and Toyota to
give up patents. On June 13, 2014, electric carmaker Tesla announced it was giving up its
patents \to the open source movement." Perhaps surprisingly, its stock price has skyrocketed
since then. And even more surprisingly, on January 5, 2015, Toyota too announced it would
make 5,680 patents related to fuel cell drive systems available, as a means to help other au-
tomakers build fuel cell cars. While standardization competition for fuel systems is rumored
to be one reason for them to open their innovation outcomes to the public, our paper shows
that the more fundamental reason lies in the possibility that they could grab the biggest share
of the enlarged pie through dierent bargaining arrangements.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated how dual sourcing inuences protability in buyer-suppler rela-
tionships, and especially as an alternative to overcoming trading frictions. Under a bilateral
monopoly, if the buyer easily nds alternate suppliers, we nd that a market size expansion
actually harms the supplier, opposite to what one might conventionally think.
We then apply the mechanism behind this result to bilateral duopoly with cost-reducing
investments by the suppliers, and nd that each supplier has an incentive to unilaterally gen-
erate technology spillovers to its rival if its buyer's cost to lower the outside wholesale price is
small. Such a free spillover generates a market size shrink, which can benet the supplier via
the mechanism aforementioned.
Our mechanism can have wide applications in various situations, such as in suppliers' in-
centives in cost reduction, quality improvement, upstream collaboration, technology spillovers
and labor training, which remain as interesting topics for future research.
We have abstracted from commitment issues and strategic competition among suppliers,
by modelling the second source as a purely competitive `fringe'. The wholesale price set by
outside fringe suppliers is negatively correlated to the degree of frictions. Chatain and Zemsky
(2011) formulate frictions as a result of probabilistic randomness in the matching of buyers and
suppliers. In their terminology, a lower wholesale price in the present model (set by outside
suppliers) would represent a lower friction level from the viewpoint of buyers.
Emons (1996), Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Beladi and Mukherjee (2012) and Stenbacka and
Tombak (2012) investigate buyers' decisions on bi-sourcing.17 In our model, since buyers have
options to procure inputs from potential outside suppliers, they continue dual sourcing and
nd alternative suppliers.
17 In the management literature, it is well established that manufacturers are willing to outsource in the
absence of suppliers' cost advantage, because outsourcing mitigates market competition (Cachon and Harker,
2002; Arya et al., 2008; Liu and Tyagi, 2011).
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6 Appendix 1: Reversing the Roles of the Up- and Down-
stream Firms
In Appendix 1, we switch the roles of the upstream and the downstream rms in the basic
model, and show a similar result when the upstream (instead of the downstream) rm has
better outside options.
Again assume the two rms' outputs are related by a one-to-one ratio, with the upstream
rm's marginal cost being constant at c. As its outside option, the upstream rm can supply
a nal product directly, of quality v(e), if negotiation with the downstream rm breaks down,
where e is its eort to improve the value (v0(e) > 0 and v00(e) < 0), at a cost of SU (e) with
S0U (e)  0 and S00U (e) > 0.
The game structure is as follows: in the rst stage, the upstream rm makes an eort e
to improve its outside options; in the second stage, both rms bargain over the trading terms;
nally, in the third stage, the downstream rm sets the quantity of nal output. The game is
solved by backward induction as before.
As in the benchmark, when the upstream rm uses a two-part tari contract, it sets the
wholesale price at its marginal cost, c. The xed payment from the downstream rm to the
upstream rm is Td. In an abstract form, the gross prot of the downstream rm is d(c),
where 0d(c) < 0 and 
00
d(c) > 0.
On the other hand, its outside option is when the upstream rm directly enters the
downstream market and supplies the nal product, with a gross prot of o(c; v), where
@o(c; v)=@c < 0 and @
2o(c; v)=@c
2 > 0; that is, an increase in c diminishes the gross prot, at
a decreasing rate. But the converse holds for quality, @o(c; v)=@v > 0 and @
2o(c; v)=@v
2 > 0.
The cross partial derivative is @2o(c; v)=@c@v < 0.
Thus, Td is chosen to satisfy
d(c)  Td = Td   o(c; v):
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Then the rms' net prots in the second stage are respectively
D =
d(c)  o(c; v(e))
2
;
U =
d(c) + o(c; v(e))
2
  SU (e):
And in the rst stage, the upstream rm's maximization problem leads to:
@o(c; v(e))
@v
 v0(e)  2S0U (e) = 0:
Total dierential of the above yields
@2o(c; v(e))
@v2
 (v0(e))2 + @o(c; v(e))
@v
 v00(e)  2S00U (e)

de+

@o(c; v(e))
@c@v
 v0(e)

dc = 0;
which gives de=dc < 0, since the terms in the rst brackets are the second-order conditions and
negative, and the last term in the second brackets is also negative.
Finally, we examine how the upstream rm's marginal cost aects the downstream rm's
prot.
2dD
dc
= 0d(c) 
@o(c; v(e))
@c
  @o(c; v(e))
@v
 v0(e)de
dc
= 0d(c)| {z }
( )
 @o(c; v(e))
@c| {z }
(+)
 2S0U (e)
de
dc| {z }
(+)
:
If the third term is strong enough, the sign of dD=dc becomes positive. That is, the eciency
improvement of the upstream rm can harm the downstream rm, even though it generates a
bigger pie, analogous to the result in the basic model.
7 Appendix 2: The Equilibrium Prots in Section 3
The equilibrium prots under the two scenarios of spillovers in Section 3 can be explicitly
written as follows.
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One-sided spillover The equilibrium prots of the rms are respectively,
U1 (Y;N)
=
92[(3   1)(9   (2  r))  r(6   1  3r)]2
2(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2
  9
2[(3   1)(9   (2  r))  (2(3   1)(9   1) + (12   1)r   3r2)]2
2(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2
  [(3   1)(9   (2  r))  3r(9   2)]
2
(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2 ;
D1 (Y;N)
=
(9   2)[(3   1)(9   (2  r))  (2(3   1)(9   1) + (12   1)r   3r2)]2
2(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2
+
92[(3   1)(9   (2  r))  r(6   1  3r)]2
2(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2 ;
U2 (Y;N)
=
(9   2)[((3   1)(9   2) + 3(4   1)r + r2)+ 3(1  2r)r]2
2(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2
  9
2
2(9   2)2(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2
((9   2)2(3   1) + (9   2)(6   1)r + 3r2)
 (2(3   1)(9   1)(9   2) + (812   30 + 2)r + 6r2)	2 ;
D2 (Y;N)
=

2(9   2)(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2
((9   2)2(3   1) + (9   2)(6   1)r + 3r2)
 (2(3   1)(9   1)(9   2) + (812   30 + 2)r + 6r2)	2
+
92[((3   1)(9   2) + 3(4   1)r + r2)+ 3(1  2r)r]2
2(9   (2  r))2((3   1)(9   1) + 3r)2 :
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Two-sided spillovers The equilibrium prots of the rms are respectively,
Ui (Y; Y ) =
92[(9   2 + r + r2)  r(1 + r)]2
2((9   1)(9   2) + r + (9   1)r2)2
 9
2[(9   2  r + r2)  (2(9   1)  r + r2)]2
2((9   1)(9   2) + r + (9   1)r2)2
  [(9   2 + r)  9r]
2
((9   1)(9   2) + r + (9   1)r2)2 ;
Di (Y; Y ) =
(9   2)[(9   2  r + r2)  (2(9   1)  r + r2)]2
2((9   1)(9   2) + r + (9   1)r2)2
+
92[(9   2 + r + r2)  r(1 + r)]2
2((9   1)(9   2) + r + (9   1)r2)2 :
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